The demand placed on European Nato members by the new US administration to spend 5% of their GDP on defence will have come as a shock to most, if not all, of Europe’s capitals, particularly those already struggling to hit the ‘official’ 2% benchmark.
During a startling tirade on 12 February, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth threw diplomacy out of the Nato headquarters’ window, pointedly stating Europe will have to take care of its conventional security in a move that calls into question elements of the Nato alliance.
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“Our transatlantic alliance has endured for decades, and we fully expect that it will be sustained for generations to come. But this won’t just happen; it will require our European allies to step into the arena and take ownership of conventional security on the continent,” Hegseth said.
Bottom 5 European defence spenders
In the analysis below, Army Technology will outline the bottom five European defence spenders in Nato as a proportion of their GDP, using the most recent data compiled and published by the Alliance in mid-2024.
This methodology makes a crucial distinction between countries with relatively little financial capability, but positive intent, and those richer countries that are likely in the diplomatic crosshairs of President Donald Trump.
What can be gleaned from the above information is that, while each deserves its place as Europe’s lowest defence spenders in Nato as a proportion of GDP, funding trends differ.
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By GlobalDataItaly and Spain have some explaining to do
Italy, for example, experienced four consecutive years of reduced defence spending as a proportion of its GDP, and is likely one of the lead targets for President Trump. Italy is the third largest economy in the European Union, behind Germany and France, who in 2024 were spending 2.12% and 2.06% respectively on defence.
Spain too will be looking at its own defence spending, which although having increased for five straight years was still just 1.28% of GDP in 2024.
Both Italy and Spain operate, on paper, at or close to full-spectrum warfighting capabilities, with each of the two countries armed forces equipped with advanced armoured vehicles, fourth and fifth generation fighters, and modern naval frigates and aircraft carriers/amphibious assault ships.
However, the depth of their capability is likely a key limiting factor, as would be their logistics capability to sustain operates for an extended duration.
Sandwiched in the middle is Luxembourg, a tiny statelet between Germany, France, and Belgium, which actually more than doubled its defence spending from 2022-2024. With less than 1,000 military personnel and just a single modern transport aircraft, it can only provide minimal contributions to European defence.
Either side of Luxembourg are Slovenia and Belgium, spending 1.29% and 1.3% on defence respectively. Both countries probably fall into the ‘could do better’ bracket, although Belgium’s considerably larger purchasing power and indigenous defence sector would potentially put greater pressure on Brussels, which also hosts Nato’s headquarters.
