One of Russia’s wartime success stories is the adaptation of its attack helicopters, particularly the Ka-52 Alligator, or ‘HOKUM B’ – Nato’s designation.
Russia improved the helicopter over the course of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: the aircraft registered the most losses out of the invader’s attack helicopters (62% in the first year of the war) to becoming the Kremlin’s foremost predator against Ukrainian operated Nato armoured platforms on the ground.
Ka-52 is an all-weather, twin-seat, contra-rotary command and control attack helicopter used in the Russian Air Force and developed by Kamov, with the first unit having entered service in 1996.
With six armament pods, the helicopter can integrate weapon systems to three pylons under each stub-wing, and it has a total load of approximately 2,000 kilogrammes.
The Alligator is a highly manoeuvrable platform, it can destroy enemy armoured and unarmoured ground targets from main battle tanks to low-speed aerial targets. Alligator is also deployed as a surveillance platform and aerial command post for a group of attack helicopters.
Other Russian helicopters include Mil Mi-28 HAVOC, known as Night Hunter, as well as the Mil Mi-24/35 HIND.
Russian helicopter losses in data
In the first year of the conflict, Russia lost almost 30% of its helicopter fleet, or 57 losses in all. The following year, the number of downed rotorcraft fell by 52%.
Just under half of these losses were due to Ukraine’s use of man-portable air defence systems; followed by small arms such as automatic and semi-automatic rifles, sniper rifles, and machine guns; then anti-tank weapons, including Starstreak and Javelin; and lastly anti-aircraft artillery.
In the first year of the war, Russian Air Force helicopters were beset with a range of technical issues. Prior to Ukraine, the Ka-52 had only seen combat in the Syrian Civil War, leaving the platform unaccustomed to the emerging threats of high intensity warfare.
It became immediately clear that when confronted, the helicopter’s automatic flare releasing systems proved ineffective. Often, the countermeasure would initiate later than required. Likewise, the anti-missile systems were not up-to-date with the tracking systems of modern anti-aircraft missiles.
Another major problem was the structural vibration that disrupted targeting and acquisition systems and impacting the pilots. Moreover, the helicopters did not employ any countermeasures for uncrewed systems.
Meet the Ka-52M
By August 2023, at the height of Ukraine’s counter-offensive (which would soon prove to be an operational failure), Russia introduced a modified Ka-52 ‘M’ variant.
At the time, the UK Ministry of Defence considered it “one of the single most influential Russian weapon systems…”
This new iteration comprised vibration suppression, new night vision and acquisition systems, and the Russian Air Force began to standardise systems, components and mechanical fluids (Nato have more than 300 different types) across different helicopters.
A particular leap forward was made with the integration of a new missile, the Lightweight Multi-Role (LMUR) anti-armour missile. LMUR has a longer range than previous missiles deployed from Alligator, such as the 9M120-1 ATAKA-1 (3.7 miles/5.95km) or 9A4172K VIKHR-1 (5-6 miles).
This enhances the Air Force’s stand-off capability against a range of targets including Ukraine’s air defences and critical infrastructure. This continues to be a major strategy for all Russian aircraft, which often strike from behind their own lines, according to a Matthew Savill, military director at the Royal United Services Institute.
All platforms in the Russian armed forces are being advanced in response to the Ukraine conflict, including the T-90 main battle tank and the Patnsir air defence system, both of which the Russian state-owned Rostec defence conglomerate pushed in the Middle East as a foreign military sales option at IDEX 2025 in Abu Dhabi.
